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On June 24, 2019, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court decided the most anticipated 
intellectual property case of 2019: Iancu v. Brunetti.2  In 2011, Erik Brunetti applied for federal 
registration over his trademark FUCT that was used in connection with various apparel items.3  
Erik Brunetti pronounces FUCT as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T.4  The examining 
attorney at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), however, thought that FUCT was the past 
tense of the work “fuck” and a scandalous trademark.5  Therefore, the examining attorney denied 
Erik Brunetti’s application, citing the Lanham Act’s prohibition against federally registering 
“immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks (herein “the immoral or scandalous bar”).6  
After unsuccessfully appealing his case to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), 
Erik Brunetti brought a First Amendment challenge to the immoral or scandalous bar.  This 
challenge would plunge both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) 
and the Supreme Court into a sea of uncertainty, showcasing just how underequipped the judicial 
system was to decide this case.  This article will argue that the Supreme Court was not equipped 
to decide this First Amendment challenge because the case contained an inextricable political 
question.  Specifically, two Baker v. Carr7 factors are inextricable from Brunetti: (1) lack of 
                                                 
2 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019). 
 
3 Id. at 2297. 
 
4 Id.  
 
5 In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) states that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the 
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it [] consists of 
or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 
 
7 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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judicially discoverable and manageable standards and (2) impossibility of deciding the issue 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.       
To begin, this article will briefly explore the history of trademark law from the common 
law beginnings until the passage of the Lanham Act8 in 1905.  This historical review is necessary 
because it showcases the policy decisions that Congress has made regarding trademark law; it is 
these Congressional policy decisions that set the stage for Brunetti over one hundred years before 
the Supreme Court decided the case.9  Next the article will examine Matal v. Tam,10 the 
predecessor case to Brunetti.  Tam plays a critical role in an analysis of Brunetti because Tam was 
the first case that the Supreme Court decided that involved a First Amendment challenge to a 
Lanham provision.11  Tam centered around the “disparagement” bar of the Lanham Act.12       
The article will then examine the decisions of both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court Justices in Brunetti.  The Federal Circuit sided with Erik Brunetti and held that the bar was 
unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment, as the bar impermissibly discriminated 
based on content.13  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,14 and the majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Kagan, also held the bar violated the First Amendment.15  However Justice 
                                                 
8 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905).  
 
9 As discussed in Part II, Congress made the policy decision to ban the federal registration of immoral or scandalous 
trademark in 1905.  
 
10 Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).  
 
11 Tam is discussed in Part III, and this paper analyzes the two main opinions: Justice Alito’s opinion and Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion. 
 
12 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1751.  
 
13 In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1341 (holding “we conclude the provision impermissibly discriminates based on 
content in violation of the First Amendment.”).  
 
14 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298. 
  
15 Id. at 2302. 
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Kagan believed the bar violated the First Amendment because it acted as a viewpoint-based 
restriction on expression.16   
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the Federal 
Circuit and Justice Kagan; these Justices believed that the term “scandalous” could be read to only 
bar federal registration for trademarks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.17  Additionally, Justices 
Breyer and Sotomayor disagreed with both the Federal Circuit and Justice Kagan on what type of 
discrimination to label the bar.  Justice Breyer believes the category label is unimportant18 while 
Justice Sotomayor believes the scandalous bar is a form of permissible viewpoint-neutral content 
discrimination.19  These blatant and fundamental disagreements between the Justices highlight the 
issue of the judiciary deciding political questions – the judiciary is simply not prepared to decide 
them.   
After examining the decision of the Federal Circuit and the Justices, this article explains 
the history of the political question, highlighting how the Supreme Court has depowered the 
doctrine over the last century.  Then the article examines the Brunetti decisions under two Baker 
factors to argue that Brunetti should have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.  By dismissing 
Brunetti as a political question, the Supreme Court could right the dangerous notion that the 
Supreme Court has the right to decide every case.  Instead, the Supreme Court chose to continue 
relying on the notion of judicial supremacy.20       
                                                 
16 Id. at 2299 (“the key question becomes: Is the ‘immoral or scandalous’ criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-
neutral or viewpoint-based? It is viewpoint-based.”).    
 
17 Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J); Id. (Breyer, J.); Id. 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).  
 
18 Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J).  
 
19 Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.). 
 
20 In this article, judicial supremacy refers to the idea that the judicial branch has the power, right, and duty to decide 
every case that is before it, regardless of whether the legislative or executive branch are involved.    
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The article will conclude by examining the possible implications that the Brunetti decision 
has on trademark law.  Throughout the opinions of Brunetti, the Justices continuously threaten 
trademark owners by severely downplaying the importance of federal trademark registration.  This 
downplaying could dramatically decrease the value of trademarks and cause trademark owners to 
lose their investment in the trademark; or the Justices could cause trademark owners to forgo the 
federal trademark registration process entirely.  In either of these cases, the public would also 
suffer.  Federal trademark registration creates the opportunity for the public to choose to purchase 
high quality products.  Should trademark holders lose incentive to federally register their 
trademarks, trademark holders would have less incentive to create high quality products or services 
because they would gain little from federally registering.  Thus, the public would be unable to 
recognize a product or service as coming from a brand with high or low quality.   
Finally, this article discusses how vulnerable trademark law is because the Constitution 
contains no provision granting Congress the right to grant trademarks.  Therefore, if the Supreme 
Court were to continue on the path of using judicial supremacy to decide trademark cases such as 
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II. GENERAL TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademarks have received important benefits, at common law, since the beginning of the 
United States.21  The oldest reported trademark case in Anglo-American law is known as 
Sandforth's Case,22 and it was decided more than one hundred years before the United States issued 
the Declaration of Independence in 1776.23  While the exact date Sandforth’s Case was decided is 
unknown, it was briefly referenced in Southern v. How,24 which was decided in 1618.25  In 
Sandforth’s Case, a senior cloth maker was found to have a cause of action against a junior 
competitor who counterfeited the senior cloth maker’s mark on inferior cloths.26  Scholars believe 
that this case conclusively shows that the English courts, as early as 1584, recognized a common 
law right to certain trademark benefits, such as the right to be free from trademark infringement.27  
Despite the early common law start to trademark law, it would take at least 252 years for the United 




                                                 
21 See Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos Rubber Works of America, Inc., 257 F. 937, 941 (2nd Cir. 1919) 
(“property in trademarks, exclusive and absolute, has existed and been recognized as a legal possession, which 
may be bought and sold and transmitted, from the earliest days of our recorded jurisprudence.”). 
 
22 Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum, 8 




24 Popham 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618). 
 




27 Id.  
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A. ACT OF JULY 8, 1870 
 The first federal trademark legislation was enacted by Congress in 1870.28  This legislation 
attempted to confer exclusive national trademark rights to those who registered their marks with 
the United States Patent Office29.30  “[A]ny . . .  who are entitled to the exclusive use of any lawful 
trade-mark or who intend to adopt and use any trade-mark for exclusive use within the United 
States, may obtain protection for such lawful trade-mark by complying with the following 
requirements . . .”31  This statute was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court nine 
years later.32 
The Supreme Court thought that Congress relied on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution to pass the legislation.33  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes Congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”34  In declaring the 
statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that the legislation gave exclusive rights upon 
registration, and the rights did not, “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the 
brain.  It require[d] no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought . . . we are unable to 
                                                 
28 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (can be viewed at: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/41st-congress/session-2/c41s2ch230.pdf). 
 
29 The Act itself is called, “[a]n Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and 
Copyrights.”  Id.  Therefore, this legislation is commonly referred to as either the “Patent Act of 1870” or 
“Copyright Act of 1870.”   
 
30 Id.  
 
31 Id. at § 77. 
 
32 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879). 
 
33 Id. (“it is a reasonable inference that this part of the statute [referring to the trademark provisions] also was, in the 
opinion of Congress, an exercise of the power found in that clause of the Constitution.”).  
 
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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see any such power in the constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their 
writings and discoveries.”35  The Supreme Court was also concerned that Congress was attempting 
to regulate all trade, a power Congress lacked.36  Therefore, the Supreme Court cautioned Congress 
to only create trademark legislation that fell within the Commerce Clause.37 
B. ACT OF 1881 
The next federal trademark statute was passed in 1881.38  Congress confined this state to 
trademarks only used in commerce “with Foreign nations or the Indian Tribes.”39  Thus, the statute 
did not apply to interstate commerce.40  Trademark scholars speculate that the narrow scope of this 
statute was a direct reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Trade-Mark Cases.41  This narrow 




                                                 
35 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.  
 
36 See id. at 96-97 (under the commerce clause, “the power of regulation there conferred on Congress is limited to 
commerce with foreign nations, commerce among the States, and commerce with the Indian tribes . . . there still 
remains a very large amount of commerce . . . which . . . is beyond the control of Congress. If [an act’s] main 
purpose be to establish a regulation applicable to all trade, to commerce at all points, especially if it be apparent 
that it is designed to govern the commerce wholly between citizens of the same State, it is obviously the exercise 
of a power not confided to Congress.”).   
 
37 Id.  
 
38 Beverly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REPORTER 




40 Shontavia Johnson, Trademark Territoriality in Cyberspace: An Internet Framework for Common-Law 
Trademarks, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1253, 1264 n.53 (2014). 
 









C. ACT OF FEBRUARY 20, 1905  
In 1905, Congress passed the second federal trademark statute.43  This legislation was the 
first time Congress directly and explicitly forbid the registration of “scandalous” and “immoral” 
trademarks.44  Congress made a clear and conscious choice to use this express language.  This is 
proven by comparing the 1905 statute to the Act of 1881.  The Trademark Act of 1881 did not 
center around morality; instead, the Act of 1881 simply stated that “no alleged trade-mark shall be 
registered unless the same appears to be lawfully used ....”45  Therefore, Congress made the policy 
decision to bar the federal registration of immoral or scandalous trademarks.  This policy decision 
would remain unchallenged for more than one hundred years.  Then Brunetti reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2019,46  and the immoral or scandalous bar would serve as a major disagreement 
between the Justices.47   
D. THE LANHAM ACT 
The next version of federal trademark statute was the Lanham Act,48 and the Lanham Act 
was signed into law in 1946.49  This legislation was the first time Congress bared the registration 
                                                 
43 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1905).  
 
44 Id. at § 5(a) (“no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from other goods of the 
same class shall be refused registration as a trade-mark on account of the nature of such mark unless such mark [] 
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.”).   
 
45 See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Barring the Registration of Scandalous and 
Immoral Trademarks 83 TMR 661, 666 n.15 (1993). 
 
46 See Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294.  
 
47 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 
48 The act was named after its original sponsor, Texas Congressman Fritz Lanham. Pierce, supra note 33, at n.1. 
 
49 Id. at 37. 
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of “disparaging” trademarks.50  The “disparagement” bar would remain unchallenged until the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of the bar in the 2017 case Matal v. Tam.51  The 
original Lanham Act would be subsequently revised by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 
1988,52 but a discussion of the changes is unnecessary for the purposes of this study.53 
 
III.  MATAL V. TAM 
 
 To understand the Justices’ opinions in Brunetti, a thorough discussion of Matal v. Tam54 
is necessary because every opinion in Brunetti refers to Tam.  Thus, a basic understanding of Tam 
is necessary to understand the differing Justices’ opinions in Brunetti.  Tam was the first case that 
the U.S. Supreme Court heard that involved a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act, and 
this case was decided just two terms prior to Brunetti.55  In Tam, Simon Tam sought federal 
trademark registration of the mark “THE SLANTS” for his musical rock group.56  The PTO denied 
Tam’s application under the “disparaging bar” of the Lanham Act.57  This bar prohibits the federal 
                                                 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1946) (prohibiting the registration of marks that “may disparage persons, institutions, beliefs, 
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”).  
 
51 See discussion infra Part III.  
 
52 See Todd B. Carver, What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988?, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 129, 
136 n.32 (1990).  
 
53 For a thorough analysis of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, refer to Todd Carver’s law review article, 
What is the Impact of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988? Carver, supra note 43.   
 
54 Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744. 
 
55 Id.  
 
56 Id. at 1747. 
 
57 Id.  
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registration of trademarks that may “disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living 
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”58     
Tam’s application was denied because “Slants” has historically been a derogatory term for people 
of the Asian descent.59 
 Tam appealed the denial before the examining attorney and then before the TTAB.60  Tam 
wanted the trademark in hopes to re-appropriate the derogatory term.61  The denial of his 
application was affirmed by both the examining attorney and the TTAB.62  Tam then appealed the 
denial to the Federal Circuit.63  The en banc Federal Circuit found the disparagement clause was 
facially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because the bar 
engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination.64  Viewpoint discrimination is discrimination based 
on the ideas or opinions the speech conveys.65  The Government believed the disparagement bar 
was constitutional, and thus the Government filed a petition for certiorari which the U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
58 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2006).   
 
59 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1754 (the examining attorney at the PTO relied, in part, on the fact that many dictionaries 







62 Id.  
 




65 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2299 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–830 
(1995)).  
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Court granted.66  For the first time in history, the Supreme Court had to decide the constitutionality 
of a Lanham Act provision under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.67    
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit.  Justice Alito,68 writing for the Court, 
came to two main conclusions: (1) the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment because 
the bar was viewpoint based;69 and (2) trademarks are not government speech70 because 
“trademarks have not traditionally been used to convey a Government message . . . [a]nd there is 
no evidence that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Federal Government.”71  
This is where the Justices’ agreement ended; the eight Justices72 divided evenly between two 
subsequent opinions written by Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy.  
Justice Alito73 focused primarily on two points: (1) the government’s argument that the 
Court’s subsidized speech cases controlled the outcome was unpersuasive;74 and (2) it was 
unnecessary to decide whether trademarks are commercial speech and thus subject to the relaxed 
                                                 




68 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.  
 
69 Id. at 1751 (holding “this provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock 
First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”). 
 
70 This is an important distinction because the “Free Speech Clause ... does not regulate government speech.” Id. at 
1757 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)).  Thus, if trademarks were considered a 
government speech, a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act would be unsuccessful because the First 
Amendment “does not say that Congress and other government entities must abridge their own ability to speak 
freely.” Id.  
 
71 Id. at 1760. 
 
72 Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 
73 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer.  
 
74 The Court’s previous subsidized speech cases involved the Government providing cash subsidies or their 
equivalent, while trademark registration requires an applicant to pay a filing fee and continue paying a fee every 
ten years to maintain the registration.  Id. at 1761 (Alito, J.). 
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scrutiny of Central Hudson75 because the disparagement bar could not withstand even Central 
Hudson review.76  Central Hudson requires that the speech restriction serve a substantial interest, 
be narrowly drawn, and not extend further than the interest that it serves.77  The government argued 
that the disparagement clause served two interests.78  Firstly, the government was interested in 
“preventing underrepresented groups from being bombarded with demeaning messages in 
commercial advertising.”79  Secondly, the government was interested in “protecting the orderly 
flow of commerce,” which is disrupted by trademarks disparaging race, gender, ethnicity, national 
origin, religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic classification.80  Justice Alito struck 
down both these interests, thus the disparagement bar flunked the Central Hudson test.81     
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, never mentioned Central Hudson.  Instead, Justice 
Kennedy82 focused almost exclusively on viewpoint discrimination.83  For Justice Kennedy, “[a]t 
its most basic, the test for viewpoint discrimination is whether —within the relevant subject 
category—the government has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views 
                                                 
75 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 
76  Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565).   
 
77 Id.  
 
78 Id.  
 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
80 Id.   
 
81 Justice Alito rejected the first interest because “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.”  Id.  (citing United States v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929).  Justice Alito rejected the second interest because “the disparagement 
clause is not narrowly drawn to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination.  The clause reaches 
any trademark that disparages any person, group, or institution.” Id. at 1764-65 (Alito, J.).  
 
82 Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
 
83 Id. at 1765-69 (Kennedy, J.).  
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expressed.”84  And under this test, Justice Kennedy thought the disparagement bar was “the 
essence of viewpoint discrimination” because “an applicant may register a positive or benign mark 
but not a derogatory one, [and] the law thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of 
messages it finds offensive.”85  As the disparagement bar engaged in viewpoint discrimination, it 
was irrelevant for Justice Kennedy to determine whether the disparagement clause regulated 
commercial speech;86 regardless of whether or not a government regulation of speech targets 
commercial speech, a regulation of speech engaging in viewpoint discrimination must receive 
heightened scrutiny.87   
Justice Thomas concurred and chose to write separately because he “continue[s] to believe 
that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, 
strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 
commercial.”88   
The opinions of both Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy’s left two important question 
unanswered: (1) whether Central Hudson is the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges 
to provisions of the Lanham Act89 and (2) whether trademarks are pure commercial speech.90  As 
                                                 
84 Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J.). 
 
85 Id.  
 
86 Id.  
 
87 Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J.). 
 
88 Id. at 1769 (citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)). 
 
89 Id. at 1764 n.17 (Alito, J.) (leaves open whether Central Hudson is the appropriate test for deciding free speech 
challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act); see also id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J.) (same).  
 








these are important questions for a First Amendment challenge to the Lanham Act, one might 
logically assume the Supreme Court would answer them in Brunetti.  Or at least discuss them.  But 
these questions were only considered by the Federal Circuit.  The Supreme Court Justices simply 
ignored them.    
 
IV.  IANCU V. BRUNETTI  
 Artist and entrepreneur Erik Brunetti owns a street clothing line with the brand name 
FUCT91.92  Brunetti sought federal registration over FUCT from the PTO for various items of 
apparel.93  The examining attorney at the PTO denied his application, finding FUCT was “the 
equivalent of [the] past participle form of a well-known word of profanity [fuck].”94  The 
examining attorney reasoned that because FUCT is the past tense of the vulgar word “fuck,” the 
FUCT trademark was scandalous and therefore, Brunetti’s application was denied under the 
immoral or scandalous bar of the Lanham Act.95   
 This bar prohibits registration of trademarks that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 96  The PTO determines a trademark is barred if a “substantial 
composite of the general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or 
propriety”; “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out for condemnation”; 
                                                 
91 According to Brunetti, “FUCT” is pronounced as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 
2297. 
 






95 In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337. 
 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006). 
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“disgraceful”; “offensive”; “disreputable”; or “vulgar.”97  Brunetti appealed the application 
rejection before the examining attorney and the PTO’s TTAB to no avail98.99 
Brunetti then brought a First Amendment challenge to the provision in the Federal 
Circuit100.101  While Brunetti was on the Federal Circuit’s docket, the Supreme Court decided 
Tam.102  Once Tam was decided, the Federal Circuit requested briefs from each party regarding 
the impact Tam had on Brunetti’s case, and oral arguments were heard in August of 2017.103  The 
Government argued that Tam did not resolve the issue of whether the immoral or scandalous bar 
was constitutional because the bar was viewpoint neutral while the disparagement bar in Tam 
implicated viewpoint discrimination.104  The Federal Circuit held it was actually unnecessary to 
resolve whether the immoral or scandalous bar was viewpoint neutral, however, because the 
provision discriminated based on content105.106  Speech is restricted by the government based on 
                                                 




99 The TTAB found that Brunetti’s mark was “highly offensive” and “vulgar,” in part because Urban Dictionary 
defines “fuct” as the past tense of the verb “fuck” and states that “fuct” is pronounced the same as “fucked.”  In Re 
Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337.  Additionally, because of how Brunetti used the mark, Brunetti’s mark communicated 
extreme examples of misogyny, nihilism or violence including dismemberment.  Id.  Therefore, the TTAB 
concluded Brunetti’s mark was vulgar and thus unregistrable under the immoral or scandalous bar.  Id. 
 
100 In the alternative, Brunetti argued that (1) the evidence does not support the finding that FUCT is vulgar; (2) even 
if FUCT is vulgar, the Lanham Act does not expressly prohibit registering vulgar marks – only immoral or 
scandalous marks; and (3) marks should be approved for registration when doubt exists as to the mark’s 
meaning. Id.  As these arguments are unimportant to this article, they are not discussed further.   
 
101 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298. 
 
102 Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1774.  
 




105 “Independent of whether the immoral or scandalous provision is viewpoint discriminatory, we conclude the 









content when “a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or 
message expressed.”107  A statute that restricts based on content must withstand strict scrutiny.108  
Strict scrutiny review requires the government to “prove that the restriction furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”109 
The Government conceded that the immoral or scandalous bar is content based speech 
restriction, but argued that trademark registration is either a government subsidy program110 or 
limited public forum111 and therefore, the First Amendment is not implicated.112  Alternatively, 
the government argued that trademarks are commercial speech and should receive “the 
intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson.”113      
The Federal Circuit rejected all of the Government’s arguments.  The Federal Circuit held 
that the grant of trademark registration is not a government subsidy program114 nor is the grant an 
                                                 
107 Id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbery, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)). 
 
108 Id. at 1342.  
   
109 Id. (citing Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2231).  
 
110 Under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress has the authority to attach certain condition to the use 
of Congressional funds to make sure the funds are used in the manner Congress intended. Id. (citing Agency for 
Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 212 (2013)).  The Government pointed to Agency and 
argued that the immoral or scandalous bar is a reasonable exercise of the government’s spending power because 
the bar on registration is simply a constitutional condition that defines the limits of trademark registration.  Id. at 
1343.   
 
111 “Limited public forums are places [that] the government has ‘limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely 
to the discussion of certain subjects.’”  Id. at 1346 (citing Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
469 (2015)).  When the government opens its property for a limited purpose, the government can constitutionally 
restrict speech consistent with that limited purpose as long as the restriction on speech is reasonable, and the 
restriction is not an effort to suppress expression simply because officials dislike the speaker’s view.  Perry Educ. 
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  Therefore, the Government argued that federal 
trademark registration is a public forum entitling the immoral or scandalous bar to a less demanding degree of 
scrutiny.  In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1346.      
 




114 The Federal Circuit rejected the Government’s argument because Justice Alito’s opinion in Tam reached the issue 
and held the government subsidy framework of Agency for International Development does not apply to 
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equivalent of a government subsidy115;116 the Federal Circuit held trademark registration is not a 
limited public forum117;118 and the Federal Circuit held that “[s]ection 2(a) regulates the expressive 
components of speech, not the commercial components of speech, and as such it should be subject 
to strict scrutiny119.”120    
 The Federal Circuit then went on to explain that, even if the immoral or scandalous bar was 
treated as a regulation of purely commercial speech, it would not survive the intermediate scrutiny 
of Central Hudson.121  This is because three of the four Central Hudson prongs122 are not met.123  
                                                 
trademark registration.  Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 176. (Alito, J.)).  “Trademark registration does not implicate 
Congress’ power to spend funds.  An applicant does not receive federal funds upon the PTO’s consideration of, 
or grant of, a trademark.”  Id. at 1344.  
 
115 While [the benefits to trademark owners who register their marks] are valuable, they are not analogous to 
Congress’ grant of federal funds.  The benefits of trademark registration arise from the statutory framework of 
the Lanham Act, and the Lanham Act in turn derives from the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 1344-345.   
 
116 Id. at 1342-344.  
 
117 “The registration and use of registered trademarks simply does not fit within the rubric of public or limited public 
forum cases.”  Id. at 1348.  “Because trademarks are by definition used in commerce, the trademark registration 
program bears no resemblance to these limited public forums. The speech that flows from trademark registration 
is not tethered to a public school, federal workplace, or any other government property.”  Id. at 1347.   
 
118 Id. at 1348.   
 
119 The Federal Circuit relied on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Tam to reach this conclusion.  Id. at 1349.  In 
Tam, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the purpose of trademark registration is source identification, and whether a 
mark is disparaging has no plausible relation to the goal.  Tam, 137 S.Ct at 1768 (Kennedy, J.).  The Federal 
Circuit found this logic applies to the immoral or scandalous bar as well; “[a]s in the case of disparaging marks, 
the PTO’s rejections under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous marks are necessarily based in the 
government’s belief that the rejected mark conveys an expressive message—namely, a message that is 
scandalous or offensive to a substantial composite of the general population.”  In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1349.  
 
120 Id. at 1349.  
 
121 Id. at 1350.  
 
122 Central Hudson consists of a four part test that asks whether: “(1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not 
misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances that 
government interest; and (4) whether the regulation is “not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”  
Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 
123 Id. at 1351; see also id. at 1353. 
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The Court found prong two, the requirement of a substantial government interest, was not met 
because the only governmental interest the Federal Circuit could find was “protecting public order 
and morality124.”125  The third prong, requiring the speech regulation directly advance the 
government’s asserted interests, was not met because the immoral or scandalous bar does not 
directly stop applicants from using their marks.126  And the fourth prong, requiring the statute be 
carefully narrowed to only serve the governmental interest, is not met because of the PTO’s 
inconsistent application of the provision127.128   
The opinion ends with a discussion of why there are no definitions of “scandalous” and 
“immoral” that would preserve the constitutionality of the statute.129  The concurring opinion 
proposes a narrowing of the statute to “obscene marks,” and stated, “[the Federal Circuit is] 
obligated to do so.”130  But, the majority holds, “[i]t is not reasonable to construe the words 
                                                 
124 Ultimately, the Government argued “Congress’ primary interest is the promotion of the use of non-scandalous 
marks in commerce.”  See Oral Arg. At 22:33-42.  The idea that the government has in interest in promoting 
certain trademarks over others was unpersuasive, however; “the government has failed to identify a substantial 
interest justifying its suppression of immoral or scandalous trademarks.”  In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1351.  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found the decision in Tam supports the conclusion that “the government’s 
interest in protecting the public from off-putting marks is an inadequate government interest for First 
Amendment purposes.”  Id. at 1351. 
 
125 Id. at 1350.   
 
126 Id. at 1353. 
 
127 The Federal Circuit supports this conclusion by listing “nearly identical” trademarks that were approved and 
rejected, for example, “FUGLY” was registered for use on clothing but refused for registration on alcohol.  Id. at 
1354. 
 
128 Id.  
 
129 Id. at 1355. 
 
130 Id. at 1359 (Dyk, CJ.).  
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immoral and scandalous as confided to obscene materials131.”132  The Federal Circuit explained 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that the definition of obscenity for the purposes of the 
First Amendment is ‘material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interests’ i.e., 
‘material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.’”133  Further, no dictionary defines 
“immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms.134  Therefore, the immoral or scandalous bar could not 
be saved.135  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.136 
All nine of the United States Supreme Court Justices agreed that the “immoral” bar on 
trademark registrations violated the First Amendment.137  However only six Justices138 agreed that 
the bar on registering “scandalous” violated the First Amendment.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kagan139 held the immoral and scandalous provision of the Lanham Act discriminates based on 
                                                 
131 The Federal Circuit thought that “an obscene mark would be scandalous or immoral; however, not all scandalous 
or immoral marks are obscene.”  Id. at 1355.  The Federal Circuit likened it to the common phrase, “[a]ll apples 
are fruit, but not all fruits are apples.”  Id. at 1355-356.  Additionally, the PTO previously rejected marks that 
were scandalous or immoral that were “clearly not obscene.”  Id. at 1356.  
 
132 Id. at 1355-356. 
 






136 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2298. 
 
137 Id. at 2295. 
 
138 Justice Sotomayor, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions holding they would 
allow the “scandalous” bar on trademark registration to stand, but each agreed that the bar on registration for 
“immoral” marks was unconstitutional.  Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J); Id. (Breyer, J.); Id. 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).  
 
139 Joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. 
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viewpoint140 independent of the PTO’s interpretation of the statute141.142  In deciding the immoral 
or scandalous bar was viewpoint based, Justice Kagan relied on one main source – the 
dictionary.143   
From the dictionary definitions of “immoral” and “scandalous,” Justice Kagan concluded 
the Lanham Act “permits registration of marks that champion society’s sense of rectitude and 
morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts . . . the Lanham Act [also] allows registration 
of marks when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of 
decency or propriety.”144  Therefore, the immoral or scandalous bar results in viewpoint-
discriminatory application145.146  Justice Kagan then went on to reject the Government’s argument 
that the immoral or scandalous bar could be viewpoint neutral by a limiting construction of the 
statute.147  Justice Kagan was unconvinced that the Supreme Court should try to construe the 
                                                 
140 “The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint discriminatory application.” Id. At 2230.  
 
141 The PTO viewed the “immoral” or “scandalous” bar as a unitary provision, which means the PTO did not treat 
the two adjectives separately.  Id. at 2298. 
 
142 Id. At 2299.  
 
143 Justice Kagan wrote the definition for “immoral” and “scandalous” according to the Webster’s New International 
Dictionary (2d ed 1949).  Id.  “Expressive material [is] immoral . . . when it is inconsistent with rectitude, purity, 
or good morals; wicked; or vicious . . . . [Expressive] material is scandalous . . . when it “giv[es] offense to the 
conscience or moral feelings; excite[es] reprobation; or call[s] out condemnation.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
Id. 
  




146 To bolster her conclusion, Justice Kagan listed examples of similar trademarks that the PTO has refused to 
register and those the PTO has allowed registration for.  Id.  Justice Kagan explains that the refused trademarks 
communicate “immoral” or “scandalous” views on drug use, religion, and terrorism, while the registered 
trademarks express “more accepted views on the same topic[s].”  Id.  Justice Kagan agreed these rejected marks 
are understandable because they express opinions that are offensive to many Americans.  Id.  But she then cited 
to Tam to express the notion that “a law disfavoring ‘ideas that offend’ discriminates based on viewpoint, in 
violation of the First Amendment.”  Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J) and Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1762-63 
(Kennedy, J).      
  
147 The Government wanted to narrow the statutory bar, and the result would be the PTO could only refuse marks 
that are “vulgar,” which would be defined as “lewd,” “sexually explicit” or “profane.”  Id. at 2301.  This 
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provision in a way that would render it constitutional because “[t]o cut the statute off where the 
Government urges is not to interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one.”148   
Justice Kagan was unconvinced the statute could be saved despite, as Justices Breyer and 
Sotomayor point out, Supreme Court precedent warns against interpreting statutes in ways that 
would likely made them unconstitutional.149  Justice Kagan ended her opinion with the sweeping 
statement, “the immoral or scandalous bar is substantially overbroad. There are a great many 
immoral and scandalous ideas in the world (even more than there are swearwords), and the Lanham 
Act covers them all.  It therefore violates the First Amendment.”150  
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion does not add much substantive analysis.  Justice Alito 
believes the immoral or scandalous bar of the Lanham Act discriminates on the basis of viewpoint 
and the viewpoint discrimination cannot be removed without rewriting the statute.151  Interestingly, 
Justice Alito also specifies that this decision “does not prevent Congress from adopting a more 
carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play 
no real part in the expression of ideas.”152 
                                                 
narrowing removes the viewpoint discrimination, and thus the Government believed the Supreme Court could 
uphold the statute.  Id.  
 
148 Id.  
 
149  See id. at 2304 (Breyers, J.) (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 394 (1988) 
(holding a law “will be upheld” if it is “‘readily susceptible’ to a narrowing construction that would make it 
constitutional.” See also id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J.) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 654 U.S. 462, 477-478 (2011) and 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“the cardinal principle of statutory construction is 
to save and not destroy.”).  
 
150 Id.  
 
151 Id. at 2302-03 (Alito, J.).  
 
152 Id.  
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 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in part because he agreed that the “immoral portion of the 
provision is not susceptible of a narrowing construction that would eliminate its viewpoint bias.”153  
Chief Justice Roberts dissented in part, however, because he agrees with Justice Sotomayor that 
the “scandalous portion of the provision is susceptible of such a narrowing construction.”154   The 
Chief Justice believes the term “scandalous” can be read more narrowly to bar marks that are 
obscene, vulgar, or profane,155 and a bar on federally registering these marks does not restrict 
speech; “no one is being punished” because “owners may [still] use [these marks] in commerce to 
identify goods.”156    
Justice Breyer, like Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor, believes the “scandalous” 
portion of the provision can be interpreted to refer only to “certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ 
modes of expression.”157  To Justice Breyer, the issue is then whether The First Amendment allows 
the Government to “rely on this statute, as narrowly construed, to deny the benefits of federal 
trademark registration to marks like the one at issue here, which involves the use of the term 
‘FUCT’ in connection with a clothing line that includes apparel for children and infants.”158  He 
believes the answer is yes.159   
                                                 
153 Id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J.).  
 
154 Id.   
 
155 These marks offend only because of their mode of expression.  Id. 
 
156 Id.  
 
157 Id. (Breyer, J.). 
 
158 Id.  
 
159 While Justice Sotomayor also comes to this same conclusion, the Justices differ on why the First Amendment 
permits the PTO to deny registration to marks such as “FUCT.”    
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Justice Breyer disfavors the “category-based approach” taken by Justice Kagan.160  He 
believes the Court should not dwell on categorizing the statute as viewpoint discriminatory, 
content discriminatory, commercial speech, or government speech.161  Instead, he believes the 
Court should rely on his opinion in Reed162 and use following test for the Lanham Act: “[d]oes 
‘the regulation at issue wor[k] harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light 
of the relevant regulatory objectives’”?163  Justice Breyer believes the bar on registering “highly 
vulgar or obscene trademarks” creates very little First Amendment harm164 while the Government 
has “at least a reasonable interest” in barring the registration of these marks.165  Justice Breyer 
attempts to bolster the reasonableness of the Government’s interest by citing to scientific studies 
that explain “certain highly vulgar words have a physiological and emotional impact that makes 
them different in kind from most other words.”166  He reasons these highly vulgar words threaten 
to disrupt commerce, and therefore, the Government has an interest to prevent the use of such 
                                                 
160 Although Justice Breyer never directly states this, he necessarily disagrees with Justice Kennedy’s approach in 
Tam as well; Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that because the 
disparagement bar was viewpoint discriminatory, the disparagement bar violated the First Amendment. Tam, 137 
S.Ct. at 1765-69 (Kennedy, J.).  
 
161 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J.).  
 
162 United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).  
 
163 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2308 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 2235-36) (Breyer, J.).  Justice Breyer believes this is the 
correct test because a statute that is purportedly viewpoint discriminatory, or subject to strict scrutiny, sometimes 
is held to be constitutional after weighing the competing interests involved.  Id.  For example, a statute stating 
that schools can restrict speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use is constitutional.  
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).  Justice Breyer further explains that Brunetti’s case highlights 
the difficulties of categorizing a statute; the Supreme Court has never decided whether the Lanham Act is a 
method of regulating pure “commercial speech” or regulating “government speech.  Brunetti, 139 S.Ct at 2305 
(Breyer, J.).  
 
164 Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J.).  
 
165 The Government’s interest is reasonable, Justice Breyer reasons, because when the PTO registers a mark, “[the 
PTO] is necessarily involved in promoting that mark.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 
166 Id.  
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words in commerce by denying the benefit of trademark registration.167  Justice Breyer also 
explains the Government “may have an interest in protecting the sensibilities of children by barring 
the registration of [highly vulgar] words” because children are more likely to be exposed to the 
words.168  Therefore, “the prohibition on registering scandalous marks does not work harm to First 
Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives,” and 
this part of the statute should be upheld.169  
 The “immoral bar,” however, Justice Breyer believes violates the First Amendment, and 
he joins Justice Sotomayor’s opinion because the two “reach the same conclusions, using roughly 
similar reasoning.”170  Justice Sotomayor stands in stark opposition to the majority’s decision.171  
The first divergence is that Justice Sotomayor believes the majority has “ill-advisedly collaps[ed] 
the words ‘scandalous’ and ‘immoral.”172  Instead, Justice Sotomayor believes “[the Court] should 
treat them as each holding a distinct, nonredundant meaning, with ‘immoral’ covering marks that 
are offensive because they transgress social norms, and ‘scandalous’ covering marks that are 
                                                 




169 Id. at 2308 (internal quotations omitted).  
 
170 Id.  
 
171 According to Justice Sotomayor, “[t]he Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate results;” “the Government 
will have no statutory basis to refuse . . . registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words 
imaginable.”  Id. (Sotomayor, J.).  This statement is an interesting juxtaposition to Justice Alito’s opinion.  
Justice Alito stated, “[o]ur decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute 
that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas. 
the particular mark in question in this case could be denied registration under such a statute.” Id. at 2303 (Alito, 
J.).  The stark disagreement between the Justices showcases how little standards the Supreme Court has for 
deciding this issue.  It is true that clear and defined legal standards do not always yield agreement from the 
Supreme Court Justices.  Usually however, the Justices disagree on whether a clear legal standard applies, not 
what the standard actually is.  
 
172 Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.).  
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offensive because of the mode in which they are expressed.”173  Justice Sotomayor reaches this 
conclusion by analyzing six different dictionary definitions for the word “scandalous.”174  As each 
dictionary provides a different definition, “[t]he word ‘scandalous’ on its own, then is ambiguous: 
it can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing ideas), 
or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression.”175  Therefore, she 
believes the limited construction of the “scandalous” provision on the Lanham Act is 
appropriate176.177  
   “Scandalous” would then only cover trademarks “when the speaker employs obscenity, 
vulgarity, or profanity . . . [and would allow] the PTO to restrict . . . the small group of lewd words 
or ‘swear’ words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around children, and 
that are prohibited in comparable settings.”178  Following this proper narrowing, the “scandalous 
bar” would then be a viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination that would be 
permissible.179 
                                                 
173 Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J.). 
 
174 Id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J.).   
 
175 Id.  
 
176 Justice Sotomayor further supports her conclusion by analyzing the Supreme Court’s previous actions to shed 
light on “what work [] Congress intend[ed] [] ‘scandalous’ to do.”  Id. at 2310 (Sotomayor, J.).  Justice 
Sotomayor explains that Tam decided that the goal of the “disparagement bar” was to prohibit registration of 
marks that were offensive because they “derided a particular person or group.”  Id. (citing Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 
1749).  Additionally, the majority in this case held the goal of the “immoral bar” was to prohibit registration of 
marks that are offensive because they transgress widely held moral beliefs. Thus, “Congress meant for 
‘scandalous’ to target a third and distinct type of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communication 
rather than the idea.”  Id. 
 
177 Id.  
 
178 Id.  
 
179 Id.  
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Justice Sotomayor also disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that the immoral or 
scandalous bar is viewpoint discrimination – “[t]o treat a restriction on vulgarity, profanity, or 
obscenity as viewpoint discrimination would upend decades of precedent.”180  Justice Sotomayor 
then launches into a discussion of why Cohen v. California181 does not, as Brunetti argues, 
showcase that restriction at issue is viewpoint discriminatory182.183  Instead, the issue is whether 
“prohibiting the registration of obscene, profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulation.”184  The prohibition is reasonable, Justice Sotomayor 
believes, because a trademark registration, “entails Government involvement in promoting a 
particular mark. Registration requires the Government to publish the mark, as well as to take steps 
to combat infringement . . . the Government has a reasonable interest in refraining from lending 
its ancillary support to marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”185  
                                                 
180 Id.  
 
181 403 U.S. 15, 91 (1971).  This criminal case arose from the following facts: Cohen was arrested and placed in 
prison under a California disturbing the peace statute because Cohen was wearing a jacket that said, “Fuck the 
Draft.”  Id. at 16.  The Supreme Court held that applying the statute to Cohen because of his jacket violated 
Cohen’s First Amendment rights.  Id. at 21.  The Supreme Court also held that California had engaged in 
“viewpoint-neutral content discrimination—it had regulated ‘the form or content of individual expression.”  
Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2315 (Sotomayor, J.) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-26).  
 
182 Cohen, Justice Sotomayor explains, like Brunetti was subject to content discrimination, and Cohen faced content 
discrimination that was viewpoint neutral.  Id.  However, Cohen takes place in the context of a criminal 
prosecution while Brunetti “[was] subject to such regulation only in the context of the federal trademark-
registration system.”  Id.  Viewpoint-neutral content discrimination is impermissible in criminal prosecution but 
is permissible under the framework of either “a limited public (or nonpublic forum” or “a government program 
or subsidy.”  Id. at 2316-317 (Sotomayor, J.).  Justice Sotomayor goes on to argue that whether one chooses the 
“limited public forum” or “a government program or subsidy,” “the federal system of trademark registration 
fits.”  Id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J.). 
 
183 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2314-315 (Sotomayor, J.).   
 
184 Id.  
 
185 Id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J.).   
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Justice Sotomayor concludes her opinion by stating, “[f]reedom of speech is a cornerstone 
of our society, and the First Amendment protects Brunetti’s right to use words like the one at issue 
here.”186  But, the Government does not need to be “forced to confer on Brunetti’s trademark (and 
some more extreme) the ancillary benefit of trademark registration, where “scandalous” in § 1052 
(a) can reasonably be read to bar the registration of only those marks that are obscene, vulgar, or 
profane.”187 
 
V.  THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
 The Political Question Doctrine refers to subject matter that the Court deems to be 
inappropriate for judicial review even though all of the jurisdictional and other justiciability 
requirements are met.188  Although there is an allegation that that Constitution has been violated, 
federal courts refuse to rule and instead dismiss the case, leaving the constitutional question to be 
resolved in the political process.189  As explained below, the U.S. Supreme Court should have 
found that Brunetti’s case posed a political question and left the issue to be resolved in the political 





                                                 
186 Id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J.).   
 
187 Id.  
 
188 William Funk, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS (AMERICAN 
CASEBOOK SERIES), (1st ed. 2014).   
 
189 Id.   
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A.  EARLY BEGINNINGS  
 In the notorious opinion of Marbury v. Madison,190 Chief Justice Marshall declared that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”191  
This one phrase has since been used to elevate judicial power, almost to a seemingly limitless 
power to answer all constitutional questions regarding any branch of the government.192  The issue 
is this phrase is sometimes read independently from the entire opinion.  The judiciary branch does 
not actually have a limitless authority on interpretation of the Constitution; in fact, in Marbury, 
Chief Justice Marshall specifically acknowledged that “questions, in their nature political”193 are 
wholly outside the judiciary’s review.194  When political questions are presented, it is not the 
judiciary’s duty to say what the law is, it is the duty of Congress or the Executive.195 
At the heart of the political question doctrine is the Framers’ recognition that “the political 
branches possess institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding 
certain constitutional questions.”196  For instance, the Supreme Court Justices are not elected, and 
therefore the Supreme Court is ideal for preserving individual rights without fear of Justices ruling 
                                                 
190 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 
191 Id. at 176. 
 
192 See e.g. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (The Supreme Court was able to decide whether the House 
of Representative’s refusal to seat Powell was unconstitutional, despite Article 1 § 5 of the US Constitution 
stating the Senate is to “be the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members.”); see also National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Both the President and Congress had signed off on 
the individual mandate in the new health care reform law, but the Supreme Court still decided the individual 
mandate was unconstitutional).  
 
193 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
 
194 Id.  
 
195 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of 
Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2002) [hereinafter Barkow, More Supreme than Court?]. 
 
196 Id. at 240.  
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to keep voters happy.197  But, this independence from the electorate “renders the Court a poor 
factfinder and policymaker as compared to Congress and the Executive.”198  Thus, when a 
constitutional question centers around questions of policy, there is sound reason for the Supreme 
Court to “defer to the judgment of Congress.”199   
 The Supreme Court does not, however, typically defer to the judgment of Congress.  Ever 
since Marbury, the Supreme Court has gradually given itself more and more power, while 
decreasing the power of the political question doctrine.200  The political question doctrine is at 
odds with the Supreme Court’s view of the Court’s interpretive power to decide all constitutional 
questions, and it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has basically abandoned the political 
question doctrine.201  One would be hard-pressed to find a recent Supreme Court case where the 
Supreme Court even mentions the political question doctrine, let alone apply the doctrine.  The 
famous case of Baker v. Carr202 is a key case that showcases the Supreme Court’s decision to 
begin to abandon the political question doctrine.  
B.  BAKER V. CARR 
 The Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr in 1962.203  At issue in Baker was whether a 
justiciable cause of action was presented from a complaint alleging that a state apportionment 
                                                 
197 Id.  
 
198 Id.  
 
199 Id.  
 
200 Id.  
 
201 Barkow, More Supreme than Court?, at 242.  
 
202 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 
203 Id.  
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statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.204  The Supreme Court held there was a justiciable 
cause of action.205  In reaching the decision, Justice Brennan discussed the political question 
doctrine in great detail and reviewed many political question doctrine cases.206  Justice Brennan 
then used the previous political question doctrine cases to create a list of six factors that courts 
should use to evaluate whether a political question is present:  
[1] Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or [6]the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.207 
 
 The Court held none of these factors were present in Baker, and therefore the case could 
proceed.208  Importantly, Justice Brennan stressed that even if one of those factors was present in 
the case, the Supreme Court could still theoretically decide the case; “[u]nless one of these 
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability 
on the ground of a political question's presence.”209  
 Because of this extreme narrowing of the political question doctrine, it is extremely rare 
for a Supreme Court majority to hold that issues present political questions.  A Supreme Court 
                                                 
204 Id. at 237.  
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206 Id. at 211-17. 
 
207 Id. at 217. 
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majority has however, found political questions in Gilligan v. Morgan210 and Nixon v. United 
States.211  Additionally, the gerrymandering issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer212 was declared a political 
question by a Supreme Court plurality.  Because of the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in these 
three cases, Brunetti should have also been declared nonjudicial because Baker factors two and 
three are clearly inextricable from Brunetti’s case. 
1. Baker factor three: impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion 
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that “courts are fundamentally underequipped to 
formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature.”213  But the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court did just that in Brunetti; both courts formulated national policy. 
 The Federal Circuit, Justice Kagan, and Justice Sotomayor filled their opinions with a 
variety of dictionary definitions for the words “scandalous” and “immoral.”  The Federal Circuit 
held the immoral or scandalous bar was not able to be preserved because no dictionary defines 
“immoral” or “scandalous” in sexual terms.214  Additionally, both Justice Kagan’s majority 
                                                 
210 413 U.S. 1 (1973).  In Gilligan, the Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit initiated by Kent State students that 
claimed student protesters were killed because of the government’s negligent training of the National Guard.  Id. 
at 4.  Chief Justice Burger explained that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, 
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”  Id. at 10.  
 
211 506 U.S. 224 (1993).  In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that whether the Senate could impeach a federal judge 
under Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6 was a nonjusticiable political question.  Id. at 226.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
cited the first two Baker factors – a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate political branch and the 
lack of judicially manageable standards. Id. at 228.  
 
212 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  In Vieth, the issue was whether the congressional redistricting plan the Pennsylvania's 
General Assembly adopted constituted a political gerrymander in violation of Article I and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 267.  Justice Scalia held that political gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating the claims exist.  Id. 
 
213  Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 
1373, 1379 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 
 
214 In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1356. 
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opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissent opinion reached their conclusions based on the dictionary 
definitions for “immoral” and “scandalous.”215   
 The issue is that these definitions can change over time; what was “immoral” in the public’s 
opinion in the 1900s is not necessarily immoral to the present-day public.  For example, in early 
patent law, the PTO refused to register gambling machines because gambling was considered 
“immoral.”216  Now, however, Minnesota alone has eighteen casinos.217  This evidences the idea 
that what constitutes “immoral” or “scandalous” is an inherently subjective policy decision that 
changes over time with shifts in public taste and morality.  These decisions are exactly what the 
state and local political process are intended to address.  Should the public want action to be taken 
regarding “scandalous” or “immoral” material, the public would act during the political process.  
But the Supreme Court is insulated from the public, and that is exactly why the Supreme Court 
should not have decided this issue.  Questions that are “delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy . . . should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people 
whose welfare they advance or imperil.  They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.”218       
 By deciding what constituted the correct definition of “scandalous” or “immoral,” the 
Supreme Court “interpose[d] its own will above the will of . . . Congress.”219  The Court could not 
                                                 
215 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2299 (Kagan, J.); id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J.). 
 
216 Carl Moy, Moy's Walker on Patents, § 6.15 (2017). 
 
217 USA TODAY, List of Casinos in Minnesota,  https://traveltips.usatoday.com/list-casinos-minnesota-21749.html 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019).  
 
218 Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).  While Southern Air 
Lines relates to Executive decisions, this same analysis still applies to Congressional decisions that affect a large 
population.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Brunetti not only affects trademark owners, but it also affects the 
public at large.  See discussion infra Part VI.   
 
219 Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd, 819 F.2d 1129 (2nd Cir. 
1987) 
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make this determination without deciding making a policy decision that disregards the trademark 
policy choices that Congress has already made.220  And when the Justices made these policy 
decisions, the Justices relied on standards not legal in nature. Thus, Brunetti is further brought 
under the scope of the political question doctrine from the second Baker factor. 
 
2. Baker factor two: lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
 
 As the Supreme Court explained in Vieth, a case is not justiciable unless the court 
affirmatively identifies judicially manageable standards for resolving the claims.221  “One of the 
most obvious limitations imposed by [Article III, § 1, of the Constitution] is that judicial action 
must be governed by standard, by rule.  Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be 
inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions.”222   
 The standards must be available to the Supreme Court at the time of decision,223 meaning 
a case cannot be decided on the assumption that the judicially manageable standards will 
eventually become known.  Additionally, “[a]ny standard for resolving such claims must be 
grounded in a ‘limited and precise rationale’ and must be ‘clear, manageable, and politically 
neutral.’”224  The “standards” used in Tam and Brunetti are anything but a precise rationale or clear 
                                                 
220 This was the line of reasoning the Supreme Court of Nebraska used when determining that what level of public 
education the Legislature must provide is a political question.  See Nebraska Coalition for Educational Equity 
and Adequacy (Coalition) v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (2007).  
 
221 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.  
 
222 Id. at 278. 
 
223 The Justices agreed that, absent identified standards, the case cannot proceed.  See id.  
 
224 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-308 (Kennedy, J.)). 
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and manageable.  Both Tam and Brunetti thrusted the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court into 
“a sea of imponderables,”225 evidenced by the confusion and disagreement between the opinions.       
 
3. The confusion of the Tam and Brunetti decisions 
 In Tam, Justice Alito believed that the disparagement bar was unconstitutional, and he 
thought it was necessary to explore how the bar could not withstand even Central Hudson review 
because the bar extended farther than the Government’s purported interests.226  Therefore, it was 
unnecessary to decide whether trademarks are commercial speech that were subject to relaxed 
scrutiny.227  Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, focused on how the test for viewpoint 
discrimination is whether the government disfavors a subset of messages based on the views they 
express, and thus a Central Hudson analysis was not necessary.228  Additionally, Justice Kennedy 
believed that, because the bar was viewpoint discriminatory, whether trademarks are commercial 
speech was irrelevant.229  Considering that both Tam and Brunetti faced a First Amendment 
challenge to the same section of the Lanham Act, the opinions in Brunetti should bear some 
semblance to Tam.  But they don’t, and this is because the challenge to the immoral or scandalous 
bar lacked judicially manageable standards.     
 The Federal Circuit held the immoral or scandalous bar impermissibly discriminated based 
on content, and the bar was not able to be preserved because no dictionary defines “immoral” or 
                                                 
225 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 290. 
 
226 Tam, 137 S.Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.). 
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“scandalous” in sexual terms.230  Additionally, to answer the Government’s counterarguments, the 
Federal Circuit held the granting of trademark registration is not a government subsidy program 
or a limited forum, and that the bar was subject to strict scrutiny.231  
 Like the Federal Circuit, both Justice Kagan’s majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent opinion reached their conclusions based on the dictionary definitions for “immoral” and 
“scandalous.”  Justice Kagan believed the immoral or scandalous bar impermissibly discriminated 
based on viewpoint while Justice Sotomayor believed the “scandalous” bar was a permissible 
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination. Because of the Justices’ heavy reliance on the 
definitions of these words, Brunetti is comparable to U.S. v. Nixon.232 
 In Nixon, Nixon argued that the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause imposed a 
constitutional requirement that the entire senate take place in an impeachment evidentiary hearing, 
not just a senate committee.233  The Supreme Court held that because “a variety of definitions” 
could be assigned to the word “try,” the word “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially 
manageable standard of review of the Senate's actions.”234  The Court also concluded that there 
were no judicially manageable standards for reviewing how the House counted votes.235   
Similarly, there is no way for either Justice to truly discover and manage the standards for what 
is “immoral” and “scandalous” because these are not legal terms.  These words are common words 
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that are used by the public to describe how they feel about certain topics, and there are no judicially 
manageable standards for reviewing what definition the public attaches to the words.   
 Additionally, the Supreme Court is not well-suited to determine whether a trademark is 
appropriate or inappropriate.  Any judge236 reviewing an appeal from the decision of the TTAB 
simply applies the Lanham Act to the trademark to see if the trademark is registerable or not.237  
The Court will also typically afford deference to the TTAB’s expert knowledge in trademark 
matters.238  As Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in Gilligan explains, “[t]he relief sought by 
respondents … is beyond the province of the judiciary [because] judicially manageable standards 
are lacking” because judges do not regulate the military.239  The same is true here; judges do not 
determine the meaning the public attaches to non-legal words, and judges do not determine 
whether a trademark is appropriate or not.  There are simply no judicial standards for which  Justice 
Kagan could have relied on.  
  Justice Breyer’s opinion mainly focused on how the Government’s interests in preventing 
“scandalous” trademark registration outweigh any potential harm from the restriction.  Justice 
Breyer used two supporting points: (1) scientific studies explain that highly vulgar words have 
physiological and emotional impacts that, in his opinion, threaten to disrupt commerce,240 and (2) 
children are more likely to be exposed to vulgar words if the word is a registered trademark.241 
                                                 
236 When appealing the decision of the TTAB, a trademark applicant may either bring the case before the Federal 
Circuit or to federal district courts. See Todd Schneider, Appealing Decisions of Stubborn Examining Attorneys: 
The Path of Ex Parte Appeal to the TTAB and Federal Circuit, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 141, 142 (2010). 
 
237 Id.  
 
238 Id. at 146 (citing Hope Hamilton, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How much Deference Should Federal 
District Courts Afford Trial and Appeal Board Decision?, 12 FEDERAL CIRCUIT B.J. 489, 497 (2003)).  
 
239 Gilligan, 412 U.S. at 14 (Blackmun, J.).  
 
240 Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J.).  
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 Regarding Justice Breyer’s first point, there is no way of actually measuring this.  Justice 
Breyer is not a psychologist or an economist that run surveys or impact reports.  Additionally, this 
type of data is not a standard or a rule.  The job of the Justices is to apply the Constitution to the 
actions of the Legislative or Executive branch, not determine the effect on commerce that certain 
words have on the public.  Justice Breyer’s second point is similarly faulted.  Firstly, developing 
solutions to combat these “scandalous” trademarks in public where the children can see them 
should not be the task of the judicial branch.  Secondly, whether children actually are more exposed 
to these words is not measurable.  This is an opinion.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit said that 
children were not more likely to see these words because the word is a registered trademark.242  
 From the sheer amount of confusion between the Federal Circuit and the Justices, it is clear 
there were no qualitative, constitutional standards for trademarks that the Supreme Court, or lower 
courts, could enforce.  And nowhere in any opinion, from either the Federal Circuit or any Justice, 
is there an explanation of how these purported standards could be applied in a judicially 
manageable way to resolve the issue without making impermissible political judgments.  
Therefore, this matter should have been reserved for Congress. 
 
VI.  THE IMPLICATIONS BRUNETTI HAS ON TRADEMARK LAW 
 It is clear that the Supreme Court has decided that “it alone among the three branches has 
been allocated the power to provide the full substantive meaning of all constitutional 
provisions.”243  In the Court’s view, “[e]ver since Marbury, [the Supreme] Court has remained 
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the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”244  Thus, the Supreme Court has begun to 
recognize “only one half of Marbury and ignores the existence of political questions.”245  But, 
Brunetti is the case that should have changed this; the Supreme Court should have recognized 
that it would be making a policy determination of a kind clearly not for judicial discretion and 
that there were a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the 
issue.  Because the Supreme Court failed to find Brunetti was a political question, trademark 
holders could potentially face devastating consequences.    
A.  THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TO TRADEMARK OWNERS 
From the opinions in Brunetti, it seems apparent that the Justices severely downplay the 
importance of federal trademark registration. The worst offender being Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissenting opinion because Justice Sotomayor believes that “[federal trademark registration] 
confers a small number of noncash benefits on trademark-holders who register their marks.”246  
Justice Sotomayor thereafter refers to the benefits as only “ancillary benefits.”247  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurring opinion is not far behind Justice Sotomayor.  Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that a refusal to register obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not violate the First Amendment 
because “no one is being punished. The owners of such marks are merely denied certain additional 
benefits associated with federal trademark registration.”248 
                                                 
244 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7. (2000).  In Morrison, the Supreme Court declared the Violence 
Against Women Act as unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.  
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While Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer’s opinions do not severely underplay the important 
of federal registration, their opinions do not adequately capture how important registration is.  
Justice Kagan’s opinion only mentions two benefits of registration: prima facie evidence of the 
mark’s validity and “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership,” which forecloses 
some defenses in infringement actions.”249  Justice Breyer believes trademark registration only 
“confers certain benefits upon the owner,”250 and discusses how business owners are free to use 
highly vulgar or obscene words on their products if they are willing to forgo the benefits of 
registration.251 
The Justices do not seem to understand that the benefits of federal trademark registration 
can be life changing for businesses.  It is true, as Justice Breyer pointed out, that business owners 
are still able to use a trademark whether or not it is federally registered.  But, “while a trademark 
owner has an ostensible legal right to use a mark even without registration, the value of this “right” 
should not be overstated.” 252  As the Federal Circuit has explained, “it is ‘widely recognized that 
federal trademark registration bestows truly significant and financially valuable benefits upon 
mark [] holders’—benefits unavailable if federal registration is denied.”253  In fact, “the incentives 
to pursue federal registration . . . are now so significant as to make federal registration 
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indispensable for any owner making an informed decision about its trademark rights. A federal 
registration is the only rational choice . . . .”254 
“Trademark [r]egistration is significant.  The Lanham Act confers important legal rights 
and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks.”255  The benefits a federal trademark 
registration confers are numerous: 
The holder of a federal trademark has a right to excusive nationwide use of that mark where 
there was no prior use by others.  Because the common law grants a markholder the right 
to exclusive use only in the geographic areas where he has actually used his mark, holders 
of a federally registered trademark have an important substantive right they could not 
otherwise obtain.  Also, a registered mark is presumed to be valid . . .  A markholder may 
sue in federal court to enforce his trademark, and he may recover treble damages if he can 
show infringement was willful.  He may also obtain the assistance of U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection in restricting importation of infringing or counterfeit goods, and qualify 
for a simplified process for obtaining recognition and protection of his mark in countries 
that have signed the Paris Convention.  Lastly, registration operates as a complete defense 
to state or common law claims of trademark dilution.256 
 
Additionally, a trademark registration serves as “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of 
ownership,” which prevents some defenses in an infringement action.257  The benefits are only 
available to trademark owners who federally register their marks.258 
 By downplaying the importance of federal trademark registration, the Justices are 
threatening trademark holders everywhere.  One of the major purposes of trademark law has 
always been to protect a trademark owner’s investment in his mark,259 and in an ever business-
                                                 
254 Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 605 
(2011). 
 
255 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015).  
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to appropriate the benefits of making a product that consumers like and so he will have an incentive to make a 
41Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020




centered world, trademarks are one of the most valuable assets a brand can have.  In a purely 
financial sense, famous registered trademarks like Coca Cola or Microsoft are worth an incredible 
amount; the value of Coca Cola is estimated at $72.5 billion dollars260 while Microsoft is estimated 
at a $70.5 billion dollars.261   
The benefits from federal registration, such as the right to exclusive nationwide use, play 
a large part in why these trademarks have amassed so much value.  When the Justices fail to 
recognize how valuable the federal registration benefits are, the Justices could set a precedent that 
federal registration is not important.  This could, in turn, lead to the devaluation of trademarks and 
cause businesses to lose their investment in the trademarks.  Or perhaps trademark owners will 
forgo the federal registration process entirely.  After all, Erik Brunetti fought to get his trademark 
federally registered for eight years.  That is a big time and financial commitment for trademark 
owners to make if the benefits, as the Justices suggest, are only minimal or ancillary.  Should 
trademark owners forgo federal registration, it would not only be trademark owners that would 
suffer.  The public would suffer too.    
 
B.  THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION TO THE PUBLIC 
Trademarks are a valuable tool to the public in a competitive, free market262 because a 
trademark guarantees, identifies, and sells the service or product to which it refers.263  In the 
                                                 
good product.”).  A trademark owner invests a substantial amount of time and money into making sure his mark 
is of high quality and that the mark identifies high quality goods or services.  Id.  
 
260 Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WLLR 585, 586 n.4. (citing Suhejla Hoti, 
Michael McAleer & Daniel Slottje, Intellectual Property Litigation Activity in the United States, 20 J. ECON. 
SURV. 715, 715 (2006)). 
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microeconomic theory of trademark law, the two main market functions of trademarks are: “(1) 
they encourage the production of quality products; and (2) they reduce the customer's costs of 
shopping and making purchasing decisions.”264 
Trademarks play a vital pro-competitive role in a modern economy: 
Trademarks play a crucial role in our free market economic system. By identifying the 
source of goods or services, marks help consumers to identify their expected quality and, 
hence, assist in identifying goods and services that meet the individual consumer's 
expectations. … [T]rademark counterfeiting … if freely permitted, … would eventually 
destroy the incentive of trademark owners to make the investments in quality control, 
promotion and other activities necessary to establishing strong marks and brand names. It 
is this result that would have severe anticompetitive consequences.265 
 
Trademarks create responsibility and accountability because trademarks allow consumers 
to trace low quality products to their source.266  As federally registering a trademark allows for a 
company to have exclusive nation-wide use, a federal registration can increase the pressure for 
companies to have high quality products; if a company’s products are low quality and sold 
nationwide, the company would likely have much more negative attention towards their 
products.267  Thus, federal registration of trademarks create an incentive for companies to keep up 
a good reputation for quality products.268  Conversely, without trademarks, consumers would be 
unable to trace low quality products to their source.269 
                                                 
264 McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 2:3-2:9 (5th ed. 2019).  
 
265 Id. (citing William F. Baxter, Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary concerning S. 2428 (a bill 




267 W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 168, 179 (2003) (“[A] firm 
with a valuable trademark will be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a capital loss 
on its investment in the trademark …. [L]egal protection of trademarks encourages the production of higher-
quality products.”). 
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 When the Supreme Court underestimates the value of federal registration, as the Justices 
did in Brunetti, the Supreme Court could inadvertently hurt the public.  Without the ability to 
federally register a trademark, companies would have less incentive to create high quality products 
or services because, at a nationwide level, companies would gain little from improving the quality 
of the products of services.270  Consumers would not be able to recognize a product as coming 
from a brand with high or low quality, so sales would naturally go to companies that have the 
cheapest products, usually resulting in lower quality.271  Therefore, the Supreme Court could 
indirectly take away the public’s ability to choose high quality products.  
C.  TRADEMARK LAW VULNERABILITY 
 Trademark law is more vulnerable to the Supreme Court than both patents and copyrights.  
Both patents and copyrights exist because the U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the 
authority to patent and copyright.272  As noted earlier in part II, the Supreme Court expressly stated 
that the Patent and Copyright Clause did give Congress the authority for trademark law.273  Instead, 
Congress regulates trademarks under the Commerce Clause274 because trademarks are accepted as 
being a function of commerce.275  Therefore, there is no strict constitutional grant for Congress to 
regulate trademarks.276   
                                                 
270 W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, at 179.  
 
271 McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 223, at §2:4.  
 
272 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 
273 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
 
274 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among 
the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”).  
 
275 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96-97; see also In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1344-345 (“[t]he benefits of 
trademark registration arise from the statutory framework of the Lanham Act, and the Lanham Act in turn 
derives from the Commerce Clause.”).  
 
276 See In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1344-345.  
44https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol11/iss1/2




 Should the Supreme Court continue down the current path of deciding trademark cases 
such as Brunetti, it could be the Supreme Court, not Congress that regulates trademarks.  In the 
most extreme sense, the Supreme Court could eventually decide what trademarks are and are not 
allowed, thereby depriving trademark owners of essential benefits of federal registration simply 
based on the Justices’ personal opinions.  The Justices already proved in Brunetti they have no 
qualms about making policy determinations, so perhaps the next trademark case that the Justices 
decide will create a policy where a trademark owner is not entitled to federal registration if the 
trademark is used in connection with items the Justices disapprove of.  As no clear legal standard 
exists for deciding First Amendment challenges to trademark statutes, the right case could create 
this scenario.  
 In a less extreme scenario, trademark law could be looking at a situation similar to Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority277 and National League of Cities.278  In National League 
of Cities, the Supreme Court decided, in a sharply divided vote, that the Commerce Clause does 
not empower Congress to enforce the provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act relating to 
minimum-wage and overtime against the States “in areas of traditional governmental 
functions.”279  Then, nine years later, the Supreme Court decided that Congress could afford San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority employees the protections of minimum wage and 
overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.280 
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 In Brunetti, six of the Justices did not like Congress’ ban on immoral or scandalous 
trademarks.281  Three of the Justices thought Congress’ ban on scandalous trademarks was fine.282  
Perhaps the next seminal trademark case decided by the Supreme Court will reaffirm the 
constitutionality of a ban on immoral or scandalous trademarks.  As Brunetti was decided without 
judicially manageable standards, this situation is entirely plausible because a future Supreme Court 
could also rely on non-judicially manageable standards to come up with a different result.  In any 
case, these hypothetical scenarios highlight the uncertainty that trademark owners face.  Only time 
will tell trademark owners the future of their trademarks.   
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Starting with Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court has set a dangerous precedent – that they 
alone have the power to determine what the law is, no matter what circumstances the case arises 
under.  But this is not the future Chief Justice Marbury imagined for the Supreme Court when he 
created the political question doctrine in 1803.  Instead, Chief Justice Marbury wanted Congress 
to the body that created policy decision.  Congress created a policy decision in 1905 to prohibit 
the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks.  But the Supreme Court 
Justices took the matter into their own hands and made their own policy decision.  They made 
this policy decision while insulated from the election that Congress members.  These elections 
are held to ensure that Congress is making policy decisions that the public wants.  In addition, 
when the Justices made their policy decision, the Justices relied on standards not legal in nature. 
Thus, Brunetti is further brought under the scope of the political question doctrine. 
                                                 
281 See Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2297 (joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh). 
 
282 See id. at 2303 (Kennedy, J.); see also id. at 2308 (Breyer, J); id. at 2318 (Sotomayor, J.).  
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 Instead of applying the political question doctrine to Brunetti, however, the Justices 
simply “took for granted that they had the ‘responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional 
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”283  But the Supreme Court should not 
have decided Brunetti.  To make matters worse, in deciding Brunetti, the Justices threatened the 
security of trademark owners by downplaying the importance of federal registration.  Without a 
federal registration, a trademark holder cannot access extremely valuable benefits, such as 
exclusive nationwide use and the help of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol in restricting the 
importation of infringing or counterfeit goods.  By downplaying these benefits, the Supreme 
Court could inadvertently take away the public’s ability to choose to purchase high quality 
products.  And finally, if the Supreme Court were to continue on the path of deciding trademark 
cases such as Brunetti, it could eventually be the Supreme Court, and not Congress, that 
regulates trademarks.          
The Supreme Court had a chance to fix the dangerous notion of judiciary supremacy.  But 
instead, the Court forged ahead, giving little regard to the decisions that Congress had already 




                                                 
283 Barkow, More Supreme than Court?, at 243 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111  (2000)). 
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